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with Application to Smart Meter Privacy
Farhad Farokhi
Abstract—We prove that the expected estimation error of non-
intrusive load monitoring algorithms is lower bounded by the
trace of the inverse of the cross-correlation matrix between
the derivatives of the load profiles of the appliances. We use
this fundamental bound to develop privacy-preserving policies.
Particularly, we devise a load-scheduling policy by maximizing
the lower bound on the expected estimation error of non-intrusive
load monitoring algorithms.
Index Terms—Non-intrusive load monitoring; Smart meter;
Fisher information; Privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Non-intrusive load monitoring research is dedicated to de-
velopment of algorithms for dis-aggregating overall energy
consumption of households measured by smart meters to
estimate timing of individual appliances, such as fridge or air-
conditioning units [3]–[8]. The research is often motivated by
the interest in providing consumers with energy-saving tips
to lower bills or counter climate change, performing fault
detection, and accommodating electricity grid transformations
due to integration of renewable energy. Although an important
area of research, little is done in understanding fundamental
bounds on the achievable performance of non-intrusive load
monitoring algorithms. Therefore, in this paper, we prove that
the expected estimation error of non-intrusive load monitoring
algorithms is lower bounded by the trace of the inverse of the
cross-correlation matrix between the derivatives of the load
profiles of the appliances.
Energy data, collected by smart meters, is known to leak
private information of households, such as occupancy and
appliance usage [1]. This sensitive data can be accessed
by third-party data-analytic companies1 through electricity
retailers or utility companies. For instance, in Australia, an
electricity retailer required its customers to consent to sharing
their data with third parties in the United States before
permitting them to use an online web portal [2]. Therefore,
non-intrusive load monitoring can be used for gaining privacy-
intrusive insights. This is evident from the patents on the
technology expressing its use in targeted advertising [9], [10].
Also, non-intrusive load monitoring has been proved to be
commercially viable and attractive. Similar technologies are
currently being used (albeit based on water smart meters)
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to track elderly behaviour and help those in distress [11]
with similar applications to monitoring patients [12], which
is a double-edged sword that can be used by both healthcare
professionals and insurance agencies. This has motivated the
development of privacy-preserving polices for smart meters;
see [13]–[20] and references there-in. Therefore, in this paper,
we use the aforementioned fundamental bound on estimation
error of non-intrusive load monitoring algorithms to develop
privacy-preserving policies. Particularly, we devise a load-
scheduling policy by maximizing the trace of the inverse of
the cross-correlation matrix between the derivatives of the load
profiles of the appliances.
II. NON-INTRUSIVE LOAD MONITORING
Consider a house with n ∈ N appliances. Appliance i ∈
[n] := {1, . . . , n} has a load signature of fi : R → R, i.e.,
its unique energy consumption pattern. The load’s signature
is such that fi(t) = 0 for all t < 0 (before starting to work)
and t > T (after finishing its work) for some large enough T .
Appliance i ∈ [n] is scheduled to start at τi ∈ R. Therefore,
the total consumption of the house at any given time t ∈ R is∑
i∈[n] fi(t− τi).
We assume that a non-intrusive load monitoring algorithm
can access noisy measurements of the total consumption at dis-
crete times (tℓ)ℓ∈[k] ⊆ [0, T ]. The noise models measurement
noise, privacy-preserving additive noises (e.g., differential-
privacy noise), and consumption of small loads that the
non-intrusive load monitoring algorithm is not interested in
identifying. The measurement yℓ at time tℓ is then given by
yℓ =
∑
i∈[n]
fi(tℓ − τi) + wℓ, (1)
where w := (wℓ)ℓ∈[k] is a sequence of i.i.d.
2 noises. The non-
intrusive load monitoring algorithm is interested in estimating
τ := (τi)i∈[n] ∈ R
n from the measurements y := (yℓ)ℓ∈[k] ∈
R
k using a family of arbitrary estimators denoted by τˆi : R
k →
R for all i ∈ [n]. We are interested for finding a lower bound
on ∑
i∈[n]
πiE{(τˆi(y)− τi)
2} = E{‖Π1/2(τˆ (y)− τ)‖22}, (2)
where τˆ := (τˆi)i∈[n] and Π := diag(π1, . . . , πn). We make
the following standing assumption.
2i.i.d. stands for independently and identically distributed.
2Assumption 1 (Regularity). p(w) is continuously differen-
tiable; p(w) = 0, ∀w ∈ ∂ supp(p).
The regularity condition in Assumption 1 is a basic assump-
tion that is common in signal processing results, such as the
Crame´r-Rao bound [21, p. 169]. This assumption holds for
Gaussian and Laplace distributions, and many other density
functions. In fact, any density function with an unbounded
support automatically satisfies this condition. We can prove the
following fundamental bound on the performance of unbiased
non-intrusive load monitoring algorithms.
Theorem 1. For any unbiased estimator τˆ , i.e., E{τˆ} = τ ,
we get
E{‖Π1/2(τˆ (y)− τ)‖22} ≥
1
Iw
trace(ΠRd(τ)
−1),
where Iw = Ew{(p
′(w)/p(w))2} is the Fisher information of
the additive noise and Rd(τ) is the discrete cross-correlation
matrix function for the derivatives of the load signatures with
entry in i-the row and j-the column defined as
[Rd]ij(τi, τj) :=
∑
ℓ∈[k]
f ′i(tℓ − τi)f
′
j(tℓ − τj).
Proof: The conditional probability density of observing
y given τ is equal to
p(y|τ) =
∏
ℓ∈[k]
p

yℓ − ∑
i∈[n]
fi(tℓ − τi)

 .
Differentiating logarithm of the conditional density p(y|τ)
results in
∂ log(p(y|τ))
∂τi
=
∑
j∈[k]
p′

yj −∑
i∈[n]
fi(tj − τi)


p

yj −∑
i∈[n]
fi(tj − τi)


f ′i(tj − τi).
Following this, we can compute the entry in i-th row and q-th
column of the Fisher information matrix as
Iiq :=Ey
{
∂
∂τi
log(p(y|τ))
∂
∂τq
log(p(y|τ))
}
=Ew
{( ∑
j∈[k]
p′(wj)
p(wj)
f ′i(tj − τi)
)
×
( ∑
j∈[k]
p′(wj)
p(wj)
f ′q(tj − τq)
)}
=
∑
j1,j2∈[k]
Ew
{
p′(wj1 )
p(wj1)
p′(wj2 )
p(wj2)
}
× f ′i(tj1 − τi)f
′
q(tj2 − τq)
=Iw
∑
j∈[k]
f ′i(tj − τi)f
′
q(tj − τq)
=Iw[Rd]iq(τi, τq).
Therefore, the Fisher information matrix is equal to
I :=Ey
{
∇τp(y|τ)∇τp(y|τ)
⊤
}
= IwRd(τ).
Finally, we get
E{‖Π1/2(τˆ (y)− τ)‖22}
=trace(E{Π1/2(τˆ − τ)(τˆ − τ)⊤Π1/2})
= trace(Π1/2E{(τˆ − τ)(τˆ − τ)⊤}Π1/2)
≥ trace(Π1/2(IwRd(τ))
−1Π1/2)
= trace(Π1/2Rd(τ)
−1Π1/2)/Iw
=trace(ΠRd(τ)
−1)/Iw.
This concludes the proof.
If we assume that wℓ is a zero-mean Gaussian random
variable with variance σ2w > 0 for all ℓ ∈ [k], we can simplify
the bound in Theorem 1 by noting that Iw = σ−2w .
Note that the bound in Theorem 1 is only valid for unbiased
estimators. We generalize this bound to unbiased estimators in
the next theorem.
Theorem 2. For any estimator τˆ , we get
E{‖Π1/2(τˆ (y)− τ)‖22}
≥
1
Iw
trace
(
Π
∂µ(τ)
∂τ
Rd(τ)
−1 ∂µ(τ)
∂τ
⊤
)
+ ‖Π1/2µ(τ)‖22,
where µ(τ) := E{τˆ(y)}.
Proof: The proof follows from that
E{‖Π1/2(τˆ (y)− τ)‖22}
≥ trace
(
Π1/2
(
∂µ(τ)
∂τ
(IwRd(τ))
−1 ∂µ(τ)
∂τ
⊤
+ µ(τ)µ(τ)⊤
)
Π1/2
)
=
1
Iw
trace
(
Π
∂µ(τ)
∂τ
Rd(τ)
−1 ∂µ(τ)
∂τ
⊤
)
+ ‖Π1/2µ(τ)‖22.
This concludes the proof.
We can further simplify the lower bound in Theorem 2.
Corollary 1. For any estimator τˆ , we get
E{‖Π1/2(τˆ (y)− τ)‖22} ≥
c1(τ)
Iw
trace(ΠRd(τ)
−1) + c2(τ),
where
c1(τ) := λmin
(
Π−1/2
∂µ(τ)
∂τ
⊤
Π
∂µ(τ)
∂τ
Π−1/2
)
≥ 0,
c2(τ) := ‖Π
1/2µ(τ)‖22 ≥ 0.
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Fig. 1. Examples of three generic loads.
Proof: Note that
trace
(
Π
∂µ(τ)
∂τ
Rd(τ)
−1 ∂µ(τ)
∂τ
⊤
)
= trace
(
Π−1/2
∂µ(τ)
∂τ
⊤
Π
∂µ(τ)
∂τ
Π−1/2
×Π1/2Rd(τ)
−1Π1/2
)
≥ λmin
(
Π−1/2
∂µ(τ)
∂τ
⊤
Π
∂µ(τ)
∂τ
Π−1/2
)
× trace(Π1/2Rd(τ)
−1Π1/2),
where the inequality follows from the inequality on traces
of positive semi-definite matrices in [22]. Combining this in-
equality with trace(Π1/2Rd(τ)
−1Π1/2) = trace(ΠRd(τ)
−1)
concludes the proof.
Note that Rd(τ) in Theorems 1 and 2 is a function of
the sampling times (tℓ)ℓ∈[k]. However, as k increases, this
dependence disappears. This is discussed in the following
corollary.
Corollary 2. For any unbiased estimator τˆ , i.e., E{τˆ} = τ ,
we get
lim
k→∞
kE{‖Π1/2(τˆ − τ)‖22} ≥
1
Iw
trace(ΠRc(τ)
−1),
where Rc(τ) is the continuous cross-correlation matrix func-
tion for the derivatives of the load signatures with entry on
i-the row and j-the column defined as
[Rc]ij(τi, τj) :=
∫ +∞
−∞
f ′i(t− τi)f
′
j(t− τj)dt.
Proof: The proof follows from the convergence of the
Riemann integral. The bounds of the integral can be pushed
from [0, T ] to (−∞,+∞) due to the fact that the load profiles
are equal to zero outside [0, T ].
III. SMART -METER PRIVACY BY LOAD SCHEDULING
In this section, we propose an approach for smart meter
privacy based on load scheduling. Clearly, the lower bound
on the performance of an adversary employing a non-intrusive
load monitoring algorithm for prying into a household in
Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 is a function of the scheduling
time of the appliances τ. This motivate us to solve the fol-
lowing optimization problem for finding the optimal privacy-
preserving scheduling:
max
τ∈T
trace(ΠRd(τ)
−1), (3)
where T denotes the set of feasible schedules. The cost
function of this optimization problem is however non-convex.
Therefore, there are many local optima that can be recovered
using numerical algorithms, such as the gradient descent. For
this, we note that
∂ trace(ΠRd(τ)
−1)
∂τi
= trace
(
Π
(
∂Rd(τ)
−1
∂τi
))
= − trace
(
Rd(τ)
−1ΠRd(τ)
−1
(
∂Rd(τ)
∂τi
))
,
where[
∂Rd(τ)
∂τi
]
ji
=
[
∂Rd(τ)
∂τi
]
ij
=


−2
∑
j∈[k]
f ′′i (tj − τi)f
′
i(tj − τi), i = j,
−
∑
j∈[k]
f ′′i (tj − τi)f
′
j(tj − τj), i 6= j,
and [
∂Rd(τ)
∂τi
]
qℓ
= 0, ∀q, ℓ 6= i.
Therefore, we can use the projected gradient ascent to solve (3)
by following
τk+1 = PT
[
τk + µk
∂
∂τ
trace(ΠRd(τ)
−1)
]
, (4)
where µk > 0 denotes the step size and PT[·] denotes
projection into the set T. For large k, we can replace Rd(τ)
with Rc(τ) while noting that[
∂Rc(τ)
∂τi
]
ji
=
[
∂Rc(τ)
∂τi
]
ij
=


−2
∫ ∞
−∞
f ′′i (t− τi)f
′
i(t− τi)dt, i = j,
−
∫ ∞
−∞
f ′′i (t− τi)f
′
j(t− τj)dt, i 6= j,
and, similarly, [
∂Rc(τ)
∂τi
]
qℓ
= 0, ∀q, ℓ 6= i.
4IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, we use an illustrative example to demonstrate
the results of this paper. For this purpose, let us consider three
generic loads depicted in Figure 1. These loads possess simple
forms for ease of demonstration. Assume that the additive
noise is Gaussian with zero mean and standard deviation
σw = 0.1.
Assume that the non-intrusive load monitoring algorithm
has access to the total measurements at {0, 0.5, . . . , 9.5, 10}.
Figure 2 [top] illustrates the lower bound on the estima-
tion error of any non-intrusive load monitoring algorithm in
Theorem 1 versus scheduling delays of the first two loads
τ1, τ2 when fixing τ3 = 0. Figure 2 [bottom] illustrates the
lower bound on the estimation error of any non-intrusive load
monitoring algorithm in Corollary 2 versus scheduling delays
of the first two loads. Clearly, these two bounds are very close
to each other due to the high number of measurements in the
discrete case.
Furthermore, as expected, the lower bounds in Theorem 1
and Corollary 2 are non-convex in the decision variables of
the scheduling problem τ and possess many local optima.
However, there are two points for which the lower bounds
become very large, in fact these points are the globally-
optimal privacy-preserving schedules when fixing τ3 = 0.
They corresponds to schedules for which its is impossible to
determine if the second load is scheduled first or the third
load. Therefore, the estimation error of any non-intrusive load
monitoring algorithm is large. Therefore, these are the most
privacy-preserving schedules.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
We proved that the expected estimation error of non-
intrusive load monitoring algorithms is lower bounded by the
trace of the inverse of the cross-correlation matrix between the
derivatives of the load profiles of the appliances. We developed
privacy-preserving load scheduling policies by maximizing
the lower bound on the expected estimation error of non-
intrusive load monitoring algorithms. Future work can focus
on experimental demonstration and validations of these results
with off-the-shelf non-intrusive load monitoring algorithms.
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